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Toward a Formal Model of Optimal Seller
Behavior in the Real Estate Transactions Process

I.

Introduction

Most of the existing literature on real estate market behavior ignores
the imperfect nature of the transactions process.

For example, the bid rent

models of the New Urban Economics (Muth [1969], Mills [1972], Alonso l1964])
assume perfect information, costless bidding, instantaneous bidding, universal
bidding, and complete rationality on the part of all market participants.
Several recent efforts, however, (e.g. Simon [1957], Stull l1978a, 19/8b],
Courant l1978], Yinger [1978, 1981], Miller and Rice l19/8, 1979J) have recognized

th~

fact that real estate market participants (1) are involved in a

search without perfect information and with costs, (2) sometimes are constrained by factors which affect their ability to seek an "optimal" transaction, and (3) do not receive or offer all bids at a particular point in time,
but rather must undertake this over time and often cannot recall a bid once it
has been rejected.

These efforts have attempted in various ways to incorpo-

rate such characteristics in search models that can examine their effect on
market outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate the contributions of
these existing efforts and to propose an improved model which both better reflects actual market behavior and better provides an analytic framework for

.

normative model development.

To this end, Section II will be devoted to an

examination of the characteristics of seller behavior as it actually occurs in
residential sales.

These characteristics are used as the basis for comparison

with the existing models in Section III and as the basis for development and
evaluation of an improved model in Section IV.

Seller behavior and
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residential market behavior only are treated here, although many of the results would be equally applicable to buyer behavior and non-residential markets.
One salient result from this exercise is that a search model based upon a
prototype by Rothschild (1974), in which the prior for the expected bid distribution is updated in a Bayesian fashion as bids are received, is superior
with respect to being able to extract the highest expected price from the sale
of property, both to models which assume the bid distribution is completely
known (e.g. Simon [1957]) and to models which assume the bid distribution is
unknown (e.g. Stull [1978a]).

This appears to be true especially under condi-

tions of imperfect information in which one is likely to have an incorrect
notion of the actual distribution of potential bids.

Thus, such a model is

suggested as the basis both for predictive models of market behavior and for
future efforts at normative model development.
II.

A Descriptive Analysis of Seller Behavior in Residential Sales

The purpose of this section is to provide a descriptive analysis of the
process of sale to provide a basis for comparison and development of the subsequent normative model.

There are basically eight steps through which sell-

ers proceed in the sale of their residence:
1.

The decision to sell

2.

Seeking a realtor

3.

Setting initial asking price and "reservation" price

4.

Setting initial acceptable terms of sale

5.

Adjustment of asking price and "reservation" price

6.

Adjustment of terms of sal e
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7.

Negotiation

8.

Final acceptance of offer.

The normative model to be developed later will not consider steps 1 and
2, "decision to sell" and "seeking a realtor."

It is assumed the decision to

put the home on the market has been already made and either the property is
being owner-sold or the realtor has no undue influence on the subsequent
transactions process.
Each step will now be discussed in detail.
Step 1:

The Decision to Sell

A number of negative ("push") and positive ("pull") factors influence the
decision of the household to sell the current residence and move to a new one.
These reflect both demand and supply influences and changes in transactions
costs.
"Push" factors include neighborhood decline, adverse environmental influences such as noise pollution or congestion, high crime rates, low service
provision levels (including schools), adverse financing arrangements (such as
an escalating mortgage rate), lowered income (making payment of current mortgage obligations difficult), high insurance and tax costs, a change in jo_b location or a change in age structure of the household such that the unit or
neighborhood becomes less suited for the family's needs.
tions and expectations are important here.

Bot;h current condi-

"Pull" factors include alternative

residential sites with reduced numbers of adverse influences as enumerated
above.

The relative - current price per unit of housing services and expecta-

tions of future rates of appreciation are also relevant.

Job location shifts,

of course, are major preemptive factors inmany moves, especially inter-city
moves.
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The existence of transactions costs could also be influential in facilitating or hindering moves, creating "threshold effects" in which the disparity in utility between the old and new residential location may have to be
significant before a move is undertaken.

These costs include such items as-

prepayment penalties, loan origination fees, appraisals, inspections, escrow
costs, broker commissions, moving costs, and "search costs," which include the
psychological costs, time costs, opportunity costs, and out-of-pocket expenses
associated with the search.
The above costs and benefits associated with moving are incorporated in
the household's preference function.

At that point in time in which the net

benefits to movement (including transactions costs) are positive, the household decides to place its home on the market and search for a new home.

The

order in which it does so depends on a number of factors, all of which influence the level of "search costs."

In particular it depends upon the house-

hold's ability to handle temporarily increased cash flows if the new home is
. purchased when the old home has not yet sold.
Step 2:

Seeking a Realtor

Once the household decides to sell/buy it decides whether to make use of
a broker or to handle the sale/purchase itself.

This decision has been the

subject of a voluminous literature (for example see Jud [1982], Yinger [1981],
Courant [ 1978], Miller [ 1977]) which we shall not replicate here.

Briefly,

the decision of whether or not to use a broker is a decision based upon the
desire of the household to minimize net search costs.

Services provided by a

selling broker include improving market exposure, reducing time on market, increasing sales price, providing advice on improving the saleability of the
property, handling all tours, acting as an intermediary in negotiations, providing information on and perhaps a source of alternative financing,

- - -- - -- - - -

- -- - ----- - - ---
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facilitating the various document signings, and perhaps providing advice on
listing price, bid acceptance, and sales term bargaining.

Costs include the

broker's fee (usually around 6 percent of the ultimate purchase price), and to
some extent the loss of personal control over the sales process.l

The basic

decision of the selling household depends upon whether the benefits of a reduced time on market (hence reduced search cost), possibly higher gross sales
price, and reduced effort in the sale offset the major cost of a commission
and the minor cost of some loss of control.

One would expect households ex-

periencing the necessity of quick sale to be more likely to seek out a broker's services.

A household with some leisure in the sale process and an al-

ternative avenue toward greater market exposure (via the newspaper, non-MLS
li~ting

Step 3:

book, etc.), however, would tend toward owner sales.
Setting Initial Asking Price and "Reservation" Price

There is some probability that households making use of a broker for sale
are influenced by the broker's advice on initial asking price and "reservation" price (i.e., price acceptable for sale).

This exists because of a gen-

eral lack of market information and experience by sellers.

It introduces the

possibility that the goals of the broker, as well as the objectives of the
seller, are relevant in analyzing the sale.
Assuming no significant disparity between these sets of goals, however,
the process for arriving at an asking price (and "reservation" price) is usually as follows:
borhood.
count.

First a survey is undertaken of recent sales in the neigh-

Any "unusual" financing or sales arrangements are taken into acSales prices are then usually adjusted to a per-square-foot, per-room,

or per-bedroom basis to arrive at an expected sales price for the residence • .
These generally are within a range and create a probability distribution of
expected sales price (Figure 1).

The initial "reservation" price is most
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Figure 1
Setting the Initial Asking and Reservation Prices
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frequently selected as somewhat above the average of the adjusted comparable
prices, assuming there are not significant outliers.2

How much above the av-

erage is dependent upon the seller's urgency of sale, his confidence that the
mean represents the "true market value" of the subject property, and his ex
ante expectations about the distribution and frequency of potential bids.

He

is uncertain at first (before bids are received) about what the market will
bear for his property, and he hesitates to use the average too quickly for
fear he will be undervaluing his home.
The initial asking price is then selected in such a way that it is felt
that the price ultimately agreed upon will be at least as high as the previously calculated average.

This is where "market feel" and "intuition" play a

major role in the positive model.

For, most frequently, neither the seller

nor his broker go through an explicit analytical exercise to arrive at this
figure.

The seller arid broker, however, recognize certain characteristics of

the transaction process.
One of the most important of these is that the frequency of shoppers and
serious bidders seems to be dependent on the asking price chosen.

If too high

a price is selected, few shoppers will appear and few bids will be offered,
possibly because shoppers feel the seller is not serious about selling and/or
it is unlikely he will lower his bid sufficiently to bring the property within
range.

On the other hand, if too low a price is selected, the seller may not

receive as high a price as he otherwise would.
In order to develop a deliberate, rational strategy for e xtracting a maximum expected sales price, given the opportunity costs of time on the market,
the seller must develop some understanding of both (1) the relationship betwe en asking price and the bi d frequency (Fi gure 2), (2) t he relationship between asking price and the bid level (Figure 3), and (3) the exis.ting price

Figure 2
The Relationshi p Between Asking Price and the Frequency of Bids
(unknown prior to bidding)
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Figure 3
'fhe Relationship Between Asking Price and the Expected Level of Bids
(unknown prior to bidding)
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distribution of potential bids (Figure 1).
known initially.

Unfortunately none of these is

Empirical studies have not been carried out to estimate

these relationships, and experience with the individual property is insufficient at first to extract them.

All the seller and broker have to go on is

the broker's "instinct" for market behavior and possibly a developed rough
feel for the relationships as bids are received over time.

An informal analysis of MLS sales has determined that sales prices across
most price categories tend to be about 90 percent of initial asking price, indicating that sellers average initally asking approximately 10 percent more
than they expect to get in the end.

If they expect to get the average of the

adjusted comparable prices, then they would ask initially 10 percent more than
this average.

Of course, a number of other variables seem to influence this

initial-asking-price premium.

A seller in a hurry to sell (with a high oppor-

tunity cost to continued time on the market) would post a lower asking price;
on the other hand, one with a leisurely attitude about sale would post a higher asking price.

The asking price level is also dependent on the bargaining

skill of the seller and his available array of non-price terms for negotiation.
Step 4:

Setting Initial Acceptable Terms of Sale

The sales price is not the only term · of sale in many cases, especially
today.

Special terms of financing in the form of seller or.institutional sec-

ond mortgages, blended-rate notes, assumptions, or buy-downs often play a major role in determining the ultimate outcome of a sale.

Less frequent, but

sometimes equally important, are such non-price terms as agreements to provide
certain maintenance or improvements prior to sale, lease-purchase arrangements, installment sales, deferred closings, or inclusion of certain personal
property in the sale.

Each of these, of course, has an imputed value to each

11

potential purchaser which is reflected in the offer price.

Some purchasers

may be highly sensitive to special financing arrangements (in fact they may be
unable to qualify without them); others may be relatively insensitive to them,
preferring instead to minimize the offer price.

At the same time, some sell-

ers may be unwilling or unable to make "out of the ordinary" concessions (many
today are still unwilling to carry the note), while others, usually those with
greater urgency of sale or flexibility, would prefer to provide these

non-

price concessions rather than lowering their price.
Most sellers initially do not offer unusual concessions beyond possibly
the "special financing" provided through a blended rate assumption.

Yet they

may initially have a set of "reservation terms," including willingness to pro·vide financing, depending on their urgency to sell and ability and willingness
to handle more flexible arrangements.

Most frequently they "cross this bridge

when they come to it," deciding upon receipt of a bid whether to include such
non-price terms in a negotiation.
Step 5:

This is covered later.

Adjustment of Asking Price and "Reservation" Price

As shoppers pass through and bids are received, the seller and broker receive information about the relationship between frequency and level of bids
and asking price and the distribution of potential bids.

They make use of

this information, given their costs of continuing to hold the property on the
market, to set a new asking price and reservation price.

In most circum-

stances these are lower than previously, since the costs of continued holding
often increase over time.

However, it is possible that an upward revision in

expectations of bid levels or frequency could cause an upward shift in both
the asking price and reservation price.
How frequently and how much are the asking and reservation price shifted?
Essentially the asking price is shifted relatively infrequently (every few

12
months or so) to provide "market exposure."

One characteristic of the market

is that, upon initial listing, a whole host of shoppers initially view the
property.

These are a sample of all the shoppers on the market at that time.

After a couple of weeks to a month, however, the volume falls off.

Only a

sample of the new shoppers coming on the market then views the property.

This

fact implies that "market exposure" might be a relatively short period of time
initially and longer later.

However, the cost of continued holding the prop-

erty is low initially, but increases later.

These two factors offset each

other, and it is not clear whether the frequency or level of asking price is
adjusted more at first or later.

Certainly, after the property has been on

the market for some time, the holding cost effect dominates, and as time goes
on the frequency and level of adjustment in asking price increases.
The above is also true for the reservation price in general, although the
seller's reservation price probably adjusts more frequently than the asking
price.

One would not expect to find too great a disparity between the asking

price and reservation price, especially if the asking price influences bid
levels and frequency.

Raising the asking price but lowering the reservation

price might lower the frequency of serious bids and not significantly raise
the level of bids, thus lowering the expected sales price.

On

the other hand,

lowering the asking price but raising the reservation price could increase the
frequency of bids, but also lower the general level of bids, thus also lowering the expected sales price.
Step 6:

Adjustment of Terms of Sale

The non-price asking and reservation terms of sale are also adjusted over
•'

time in a manner similar to that above.

In the event that the seller sees,

through bids received, that one particular non-price dimension, say

owner-

financing, seems to be particularly important in affecting the frequency of
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bids and willingness to consider the asking price, he may consider including
it in the set of terms offered and certainly in those considered acceptable in
the ultimate transaction.

This again, of course, depends upon his flexibili-

ty, his urgency to sell, and the perceived cost of offering the term adjustment.

Again, he would probably adjust the set of asking terms less frequently

to allow market exposure, but would be expected to continuously adjust the set
of reservation terms.
Step 7: · Negotiation
The negotiation phase of the transactions process is extremenly important
but is often overlooked.

Upon the receipt of each bid, the seller may enter

into a bargaining process with the bidder (presumably whether or not the bid
is below the reservation price).

The elements in bargaining include both the

sales price and the non-price terms.

The level of a counter-bid is important

in that if it is too high, the seller runs the risk of losing the

potenti~l

seller (which he may be prepared to do, depending on his opportunity costs and
his expectations for the future).

If it is too low, he consummates the sale,

but receives less than he would have otherwise.

The seller and buyer both are

presumably more willing to "give in" on those dimensions which are relatively
less costly to them.

They are also willing to be more generous on those di-

mensions which are further above (below) the reservation price or term level.
A seller might find it advantageous to "hold back" certain dimensions of
acceptable sales terms from the initial set of asking terms and even from the
set of offered terms early in the bargaining process.

He can offer for nego-

tiation first that dimension which has the least marginal value to him and
that which he thinks has the greatest marginal value for the bidder, or he may
attempt to "mislead" the bidder into thinking that one dimension is of great
importance to him when it is not (or vice versa) and then offering it later as
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a "concession."

Presumably, if all dimensions of the bidder's ultimate offer

are above the seller's final reservation price and terms levels, the sale will
be comsummated.

If all are below, the sales will not be consummated.

If some

are above and some below, the seller ·must balance the surplus of those above
against the deficit of those below to arrive at a decision whether or not to
accept the offer.
There is a substantial literature on bargaining theory which is relevant
here (for example, see von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953], Luce and Raiffa
[1957], Owen [1968], Stahl [1972], Harsanyi [1976], Case [1979]).
discuss this in more detail in Section III.

We will

However, in practice the sophis-

tication applied to negotiating behavior is substantially lower than that espoused as a normative model in the literature.
The broker is often instrumental in the bargaining process and has a
stake in consummating the sale.

Thus, acting as the intermediary, he continu-

ously counsels the principals toward a middle ground.

He is the representa-

tive of the seller but does not have a high monetary stake in negotiating toward a high sales price, since his marginal return from doing so is only a
small percentage of the increased sales price, while his potential loss is
high, in view of competition ainong brokers for the sale.3
Step 8:
Of

Acceptance of Offer
course, the cost of not accepting an offer is both the time (and asso-

ciated costs) involved with waiting for additional bids and the possibility
that an offer so high will not come again.

That has to be weighed against the

more certain benefits accrued from the sale.
This has been essentially a descriptive analysis of the way residential
properties tend to be sold (although to some extent it describes all real

-

- - --

- ------- - - - --

----
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estate markets).

The analysis undertaken by the seller and broker to develop

an appropriate strategy to maximize return is seen to be relatively crude, in
part because the empirical information necessary to make more sophisticated
decisions does not exist, in part because neither has the analytic expertise
nor the time to make such an analysis, in part because there is so much uncertainty about the future that even information about current conditions could
change tomorrow.
It is the contention of this study that this descriptive model can be analytically exposited to allow more precise examination of the influence of the
various elements which affect a sale.

Furthermore, in certain applications,

the descriptive model can be extended to a normative model which can improve
sales behavior through the development of explicit optimizing methodologies.
Toward this end, in the next section we shall review existing analytic models
of the real estate, and related, transaction processes and compare their elements to those of the descriptive model developed here.

The final section

will develop a model of seller behavior which improves upon existing models
and most closely matches (and even improves upon) actual behavior.
III.

Existing Models of the Real Estate Transactions Process

There are clearly a number of

characteri~tics

of the real estate

transac~

tiona process as described above which serve as a guide to the proper nature
of any formal modeling effort.

First, the process is not an auction but rep-

resents a sequential bid process without recall.

Second, it exists in a world

with imperfect (or no) information about the distribution of potential bids or
the relationships between asking price and bid frequencies and levels.

Third,

it consists not only of a "price" transaction, but also a "nonprice" transac-tion in the form of the non-price terms of the contract.

Finally, bargaining
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becomes a major element of the process once the offer bid and reservation
price are within range of each other.
There have been a number of modeling efforts which possess to a greater
or lesser degree these characteristics.

They are all part of a general class

of "optimal stopping'' models, so-called because they describe optimal behavior
with respect to the acceptance or rejection of bids received over time.

In

the first part of this section we shall review existing search models in the
real estate/urban land economics tradition and compare them to the descriptive
model above.

Additional contributions from the job search and economics of

uncertainty literature will be discussed in the second part of this section.
Each model will be discussed in detail and compared along the following dimensions:
1.

Whether it models seller, buyer, broker, or market (equilibrium)
behavior.

2.

Whether the distribution of bids is known, unknown, or learned.

3.

The nature of the relationship between level and frequency of bids
and asking price.

4.

Whether the unit of measurement

5.

Whether or not non-price terms are considered.

6.

Whether or not bargaining behavior is considered.

7.

The manner in which costs of search are included.

8.

Whether or not future bids are discounted.

9.

Whether the time horizon is finite or infinite.

i~

money or utility.

· These results are summarized in Table 1 and compared to the characteristics of
the descriptive model of the transactions process developed in Section II.
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Models of Real Estate Market/Urban Land Economic Behavior
Herbert Simon, in his seminal text Models of Man (1957), was the first to
apply optimal stopping considerations to a model of the real estate transactions process.

His intent was

••• to replace the global rationality of economic man with
a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the
access to information and the computational capabilities
that are actually possessed by organisms, including man,
in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist."4
He first considers the highly idealized situation of a seller of a home who

has complete information about the distribution of bids each time period, is
un}.imited in search time, and faces no costs of search or information gathering.

His objective is to maximize the expected value of the sales price.

'

Simon shows a rational reservation or "acceptance" price, which would optimize
seller behavior, would come about only if the probability distribution of offers shifts downward over time "with sufficient rapidity."

This condition is

made necessary since the model neglects the possibility of a cost element to
continued search or a finite time horizon.

Simon hypothesizes this downward

shift could occur under expectations of falling prices or by discounting future prices to the present (which implies an opportunity cost of capital).
An alternative model is then proposed which limits the search period to

one in which the probability of sale is unity after a "sufficiently long" period.

The reservatio.n price at this time is set such that sale is insured.

Under such conditions, one can work backward using dynamic programming techniques to determine the reservation price trend over time.
Simon acknowledges both of these models to be only rough approximations
to reality due to the "perfect knowledge" requirement and contends that in the
real world a seller must make approximations to avoid using the information he
doesn't have:
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First, he will probably limit the planning horizon by assuming a price at which he can certainly sell and will be
willing to sell in the nth time period. Second, he will
set his initial acceptance price quite high, watch the
distribution of offers he receives, and gradually and approximately adjust his acceptance price downward or upward
until he receives an offer he accepts -- without ever making probability calculations."S
He does npt formally develop such a model.6

Stull (1978a) attempts to address the issue of rationality under imperfeet information by moving to the other extreme and assuming minimal information on the part of the seller.

He argues that it is unrealistic to expect

the seller to have even a notion (developed over time) of the distribution of
poten~ial

bids.

Rather he is assumed to know with certainty only that the po-

tential offers will be within a certain range.

He then follows a decision

strategy with respect to bid acceptance/rejection which maximizes the probability of choosing the highest bidder (rather than maximizing the expected
price, as in Simon's model).

He is subject to no costs of continued search,

but is assumed to have a finite time horizon for the sale, imposed by a
limitation on the (known) number of bids.

Thus, the solution still has the

reservation price property, as in the Simon model.

The number of bids to be

accepted can be obtained by choosing the largest value of N subject to the
condition that the probability of waiting more than t* periods, q*, to get N
serious offers is appropriately small.
Stull compares his results to a non-optimizing rule-of-thumb strategy of
accepting the first serious offer (i.e., within the acceptable range) and to
the basic Simon model, an expected-price-maximization strategy with a known
uniform distribution of bids within the price range.

He finds the first

strategy to yield a shorter waiting time to sale but a lower probability of
receiving the highest bid except when N is small.

Thus only when "time is of

the essence" is such a rule-of-thumb appropriate.

The Simon model, however,
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yields (for N>l) a higher expected price and shorter expected waiting time.
This is expected, as the seller is using the additional known distribution to
improve his performance.

Stull does not consider the performance of the Simon

model when the distribution of bids is different from that assumed by the
seller.
In a second model, Stull (1978b) investigates the asking rent behavior of
a landlord who has complete knowledge of the "rental probability" function
(the probability a unit will be rented for a given asking rent), which is
equivalent to assuming he has complete knowledge of the underlying acceptance
rent distribution.
"f!ill~ack

rent"

He limits his time horizon by exogeneously setting a

Rc, (thought of as the landlord's perception of what the unit

is ''worth" on the current market) which he asks in all subsequent periods if
the unit is not rented by period t.

t is considered to be given at first, but

is later considered to be endogenously determined by that asking rent strategy
which maximizes the landlord's present discounted value of expected returns.
Thus it depends upon the landlord's time preference.

One major departure of

this model from previous models is the assumption that the frequency of bids
is dependent on the asking rent, a relationship which is assumed to be completely known.
The landlord's objective is to set his reservation rent (which is considered to be identical to his asking rent) such that he maximizes his expected
(undiscounted) return in each period.
no costs to continued search.

Again, as in previous models, there are

The reservation price property is established

by virtue of the selection of the fallback rent level and the time period t in
which it becomes effective.

Stull shows his assumptions result in the stan-

dard falling reservation rent trend over time and a higher expected return
(but longer expected waiting time) for a higher t (i.e., a longer waiting
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period to the "fallback rent").

He advocates an empirical test of the assump-

tions and implications of his model.
Courant (1978) employs a model of buyer search (with or without broker
"guidance") in an urban housing market to investigate price dynamics under
conditions of racial discrimination.

It differs from the above models in that

it permits recall, in a sense, since it assumes enough houses are on the market at any given time that one does not have to wait for additional houses to
appear to receive an acceptable price offer.
jected, it can again be "called up" later.

Furthermore, if one house is reIt also differs from previous mod-

els in that it considers an explicit, constant cost to continued search.

Buy-

ers are assumed to be attempting to maximize their expected utilities (rather
than sellers maximizing expected monetary profits), although utility and money
are assumed to be equivalent (i.e., the marginal utility of money is assumed
to be constant).

Buyers are also assumed to have perfect knowledge about the

distribution of utilities derived from purchasing houses in the market.

These

distributions, of course, vary from buyer to buyer, depending on their different sets of tastes and preferences.
A buyer is assumed to continue his search among the available alternatives until the expected gain in utility derived from further search will just
equal the loss in utility associated with the cost of additional search.
There is not an exogenous limit placed on the period of search (or equivalently on the "fallback" utility level), nor is one needed, since the existence of
a search cost causes the solution to converge.
one:

The solution is a familiar

the buyer has a "reservation utility" level which falls over time.

thermore, people stop searching short of their "dream house," even if that
dream is defined within a current budget constraint.

Fur-
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Rather than describing buyer or seller behavior, Yinger (1978, 1981) models the behavior of brokers searching for buyers and listings.

Brokers are

assumed to purchase units of search for buyers and sellers at a cost.

The

amount of search a broker undertakes affects the probability that any given
buyer or seller will come to that broker's office.
search and this probability is assumed known.
this relationship is the same for all brokers.

The relationship between

It is assumed under competition
Furthermore brokers are as-

sumed to have complete power to set asking prices, which they adjust over time
as they receive information about demand in the form of offer prices.

Brokers

receive payment of a commission for their services, which is the same for all
brokers under competition.
consummated.

They also pay transaction costs whenever a sale is

The objective of all brokers is to maximize their expected net

income.
At the same time, sellers on the market are sensitive to the rate of commission charged by brokers and reduce their use of broker services as the commission level increases.

The relationship between the commission level and

the use of a broker is assumed known.

Buyers, the third set of actors in the

housing market, are responsive to the average market price of housing V, and
the likelihood of their buying a house is some (known) decreasing function of
V.

This function is analogous to the demand curve facing a single seller; the

greater the competition in the housing market and the lower buyers' search
costs, the more responsive is this function to a change in V.

Buyers are as-

sumed to search for housing until they find a house they are willing to buy or
until the expected gain from search is less than the cost.
The solution of the model determines (1) the commission level c, (2) the
average sale price of housing V (the optimal adjustment of asking price over
time is not determined), (3) the optimal number of units of search purchased
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for buyers SH, and (4) the optimal number of units of search purchased for
listings

s1 •

Each broker effectively increases search until the expected mar-

ginal value product is less than the cost.
Unlike the above models, the Yinger model does not determine a reservation price trend over time.

It also assumes all relationships (e.g., between

contacts and units of search, between contacts and the commission level, and
between the probability of consummating a sale and the average market price of
housing) are known.

Thus the optimization problem is not dealing with uncer-

tainty or learned relationships and distributions over time.
A final search model in the real estate market literature developed by
Miller and Rice (1978, 1979) is the only model to consider market equilibrium
(i.e., the behavior of both buyers and sellers simultaneously) under conditions of price uncertainty.

The objective function of sellers of real estate

is to maximize their expected net revenue; that of buyers to minimize their
expected net cost.

In each time period a buyer (seller) chooses a sample of

sellers (buyers) at random (the size of the sample is a given function of the
search cost).

He then determines which of these has the lowest (highest) res-

ervation price and compares this to his own reservation price.

A transaction

occurs if the buyer's (seller's) price is not exceeded by (greater than) the
lowest seller's (highest buyer's) price in the sample of that period.
wise search continues.

Other-

Each buyer and seller has a cost to continued search

which is assumed to increase over time (rather than remain constant as in the
previous models).

The buyer's and seller's search cost parameters are deter-

mined randomly under the assumption they are generated by a uniform distribution.

Since costs of continued search are considered, it is not necessary to

impose a finite time horizon on buyers or sellers.
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The distribution of potential bids is assumed to be known by sellers as
is the distribution of available reservation prices by buyers.
distributions are assumed to be uniform.

Indeed, these

Reservation price and bid trends are

imposed exogenously and are assumed to be linearly declining or increasing, in
contrast to other models in which these are determined endogenously.

Simula-

tions using this model estimate transaction prices and time-to-sale under a
number of assumptions about market parameters.

Results confirm that price

dispersion is an expected result of uncertainty in the market and furthermore
that price dispersion increases in markets of relatively high transaction
costs.
A Critique
The literature discussed above is seen to vary greatly in its adherence
to the characteristics of the descriptive search process developed in Section
II.

No single model represents fully all dimensions considered important as

an adequate representation of reality.
Consideration of transactions or search costs is neglected completely in
Simon and Stull, while Yinger and Courant assume constant search costs over
time and Miller-Rice assume increasing search costs.

The lack of considera-

tion of search costs forces Simon and Stull to impose exogenously a finite
time horizon on the search period (or alternatively, in Simon's case, require
discounting of future receipts or a downward shift in the expected bid distribution over time).
Assumptions about knowledge of the distribution of potential bids also
vary greatly.

Most of the models, including Simon, Stull (1978b), Courant,

Yinger, and Miller-Rice assume it is completely known, which reduces the problem of optimization to a relatively straightforward one.

Stull (1978a), on

the other hand, takes the other extreme and assumes a completely unknown
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distribution (with the exception of knowing the range of bids).

None of the

models incorporate an assumption that a seller (or market participant) can improve upon his knowledge of the bid distribution as bids are received over
time, although both Simon and Yinger (1978) acknowledge this "learning" to be
an important part of the transactions process.

Stull (1978a) rejects the

learning hypothesis because he assumes it requires one to have unrealistic a
priori knowledge about the functional form of the distribution, with the
learning only allowing improved estimates of the parameters.
With the exception of Stull (1978b) and Yinger, none of the existing models acknowledge the possibility that both the level (or distribution) and frequency of bids could be affected by the asking price.

Stull (1978b) assumes a

relationship between the asking rent level and the likelihood of renting, but
this relationship is assumed

known~

priori.

Similarly, Yinger assumes these

relat:f_onships exist but that all such relationships are fully known at the
outset.

Finally, none of the real estate search models consider bargaining to

be an element in the transactions process.

Only Stull (1978a) even mentions

such a possibility.
Thus, in order to improve our ability to portray analytically the seller's search process, it will be necessary not only to extract individual elements of the various existing models applied to the real estate market, described above, but also to search more broadly for promising contributions in
the existing optimal stopping literature, especially the literature on job
search and the economics of uncertainty.

The following discussion reports up-

on several such promising contributions.
Models of Job Search and the Economics of Uncertainty
In the first part of this section we saw that existing search models of
the real estate transactions process are inadequate in several dimensions for
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adequately describing the process.

This is particularly true for four areas

in which none of the existing models provide any considerations:

(1) know-

ledge of the distribution of potential bids, (2) the nature of the relationship between the level (or distribution) and frequency of bids and the asking
price,(3) the existence of both price and non-price terms to the transaction,
and (4) the existence of bargaining as an important element in the determination of the ultimate terms of sale.7

The optimal stopping and bargaining lit-

terature existing outside of the real estate framework, in particular the litterature on job search and the economics of uncertainty, will be surveyed in
this part to see what contributions they can provide in these four areas.
a)

Knowledge of the Distribution of Potential Bids.

There have been

several efforts designed to consider the case in which the seller (or job
searcher) does not know the distribution of bids (or wage offers) initially
but in which each offer provides information which the seller uses to update
his prior in a Bayesian fashion.

The declining reservation price character-

istic has been shown to hold in certain of these cases but not in others.
DeGroot (1968), Obregon (1967), McCall (1970), and Lippman and McCall (1976)
consider the cases in which the form of the bid distribution is known, but one
or more parameters are known only up to a prior probability distribution.
DeGroot completely solves the problem when the distribution is known to be
normal with a normal variance and unknown precision.

Obregon considers the

case in which the wage distribution is exponential with unknown parameter,
on which a gamma prior distribution is placed.

~,

McCall and Lippman and McCall

consider the more general case in which the distribution is a known general
distribution, the mean and higher moments are updated in Bayesian fashion, and
an accept/reject decision is made after a bid is received.
reservation property is shown to hold.

In these cases the

In a similar case considered by
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Lippman and McCall in which a decision is made prior to updating, the reservation price property may not hold.
Of course, the problem with these models, as observed by Stull (1978a),
is that they require

~

priori knowledge of the distributional form, which is

more knowledge than sellers can usually be expected to possess.

Another more

promising model of adaptive search, which is less restrictive in this respect,
is by Rothschild (1974).

Rothschild considers the case in which the prior

distribution is a Dirichlet.S

The general nature of the Dirichlet distribu-

tion permits an approximation (in the limit) to any probability distribution
of prices.

Thus, this case is more general than at first perceived and does

not possess the restrictive assumptions of the Degroot and Obregon models.
Furthermore, the adaptive expectations process associated with the Rothschild
model approximates what actually seems to go on in our description of the
transactions process.

The seller has a reasonable idea of the range in which

he will receive bids, but he is not always totally ignorant of the distribution of the bids as in the Stull (1978a) case.

Over time he develops a "feel"

for this distribution without any perception of the functional form it is approximating.
Rothschild shows in his solution that the reservation price property
holds in the Dirichlet case.

Furthermore, when the searcher's prior is

Dirichlet, an increase in the dispersion of the expected offer distribution
increases the reservation price, as in the case of a known distribution.
Thus, he concludes that "optimal search rules from unknown distributions have

..

the same qualitative properties as search rules from known distributions."
The Rothschild model holds great promise for application in the real estate
case; in Section IV we will explore its potential further.
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b)

The Relationship Between the Level (or Distribution) and Frequency of

Bids and the Asking Price.

These relationships, like the bid distribution

above, are based upon "learning" and are unknown at the outset.

Thus we would

expect analytic treatment of this situation to be similar to the "learned" bid
distribution case.

There are few treatments of this situation in the existing

optimal stopping/job search literature.

Salop (1973) develops a model in

which the searcher has some influence over the distribution of bids through
systematic search (using prior information) rather than random search or receipt of bids.
se~rcher

This creates a declining reservation price over time as the

moves down his queue of bids.

However, this case has nothing to do

with influence over the distribution of bids caused by asking price

behavior~

Lippman and McCall discuss the case in which the number of bids received
per period is not one but is rather a random variable (again unrelated, however, to asking price).

They consider two cases, that in which the number of

offers received is (i) at most one, and (ii) has expected value one.

In the

first case they found the intuitive result that, as the probability of receiving a job offer in any period q decreases, the reservation price decreases.
Hence the less frequently that offers are made the greater, ceteris paribus,
the likelihood of their acceptance.
In the second case, they found it was preferable to have exactly one offer per day, rather than a random number with a mean of one per day.

Further-

more, the minimal acceptable price is lower when there are a random number of
offers.

This is because, with the possibility of more than one acceptable of-

fer arriving on the same day, the fact that the expected cost per observation
is still c and the fact that the seller can utilize but one acceptable offer
mean that the effective cost per utilized acceptable offer has increased.

- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Note that in both the above situations, the frequency (or level) of bids
is still unaffected by the asking price; however they do affect the reservation price.

In such a case, asking price behavior is totally independent of

the ultimate outcome of the transaction.

This situation is unrealistic for

our purposes, since it is well known that asking price strategies can affect
the ultimate sales price in real estate market transactions.

Thus, this is

fertile ground for future research efforts.
c)

The Existence of Both Price and Non-Price Terms to the Transaction.

To the extent that the various non-price terms of a transaction can be translated to monetary (or additive utility) terms, there is little problem with
conceptually extending single-term (price) search models to the multi-term
case.

The objective function then collapses to maximizing an equivalent ad-

justed expected sales price (or utility).9

The ultimate set of optimal reser-

vation terms would be at that point where their marginal cost (or utility) is
equal, and a seller would constantly be comparing the expected marginal revenue (or utility) from waiting for another bid (derived from the set of all
terms, not merely the sales price) with the expected marginal cost.

However,

practically and empirically, the task of adequately estimating the marginal
costs of the various non-price terms would be a formidable one, but one which
nonetheless ought to receive attention in future research efforts.
d)

Bargaining as a Determinant of the Terms of Sale.

ly on the bargaining/game theory literature.

Here we rely sole-

The situation is one in which a

counter-bid has been received by a seller which is below both the asking price
arid (possibly) the reservation price. 10

Ignoring the existence of non-price

dimensions,ll the objective of the seller is to set his "response price" at
such a level that the ultimate transaction price will maximize his return.12
If the seller sets his response price too low, he could potentially be giving
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up too much.

If he sets it too high, there is a greater likelihood the poten-

tial buyer will either lower his bid or drop out of the negotiations and the.
sale will not be consummated.

Thus, the response offers are dependent on the

previous sets of offers by the opposing party.

The buyer is assumed to have

no knowledge of the reservation price of the seller but can eliminate certain
ranges as response bids are received.

Furthermore, both the seller and buyer

are assumed initially to have no understanding of the relationship between
their response bids and the subsequent response bids of their opponent.
relationships are learned over time as bids are made.

These

This situation is very

analogous to the previous learning situations for bid distributions in which
priors are updated in a Bayesian fashion.
This bargaining situation is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.

In Figure

4, as the number of bids received or offered increases, the asking and reservation prices of the seller normally decline and the expected offer and reservation prices of buyers increase.

To the left of A, no transaction is possi-

ble since the maximum reservation price of the buyer is lower than the minimum
reservation price of the seller.

Nonetheless the parties do not know this and

would "test each other out" through bargaining.
bargaining must be unsuccessful.

The ultimate outcome of such

At point B (and presumably beyond), on the

other hand, the transaction will take place without bargaining, since the offer bid of the buyer just equals the asking price of the seller.
Between points A and B, however, bargaining is undertaken and may be successful in effecting a transaction.

Between B and D it will always be suc-

cessful since all price levels between the asking price and the offer bid are
feasible to both parties.

Nonetheless, each will attempt to extract what he

can through prudent bargaining.

Between C and D all price levels are feasible

to the seller, but there is a possibility at higher bids that the buyer will
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Figure 4
Bargaining Domains in the Transactions Process
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Figure 5
Bargaining Toward a Final Transaction Price
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find a response bid by the seller to be infeasible, and i f he feels that is
his final offer, will exit the negotiations.

Between A and C, there exist

possibilities that both the buyer and seller will find infeasible price levels.
The bargaining situation at a point such as E is displayed in Figure 5.

Rs·

The asking price of the seller is at A and his reservation price at
offer price of the buyer is at B and his reservation price at Rb.
set of offering prices is at F, the intersection of A and B.

The

The initial

The feasible set

of subsequent pairs of bids is all bids smaller than A but larger than B
bounded by the minimum reservation price of the seller Rs, the maximum reservation price of the buyer Rb, and the transaction line (where the offer price
equals the acceptance price) 01.

The feasible set of pairs of bids therefore

is the shaded area CDEFG and the range of potential transaction prices exists
between C and D.
As

a rational decision maker, a buyer/seller would not let a potential

transaction slip by by refusing in the end to move out of areas CGH or DEI,
respectively, although a situation may develop in which a buyer/seller may
misestimate his opponent's ultimate reservation price and thus lose the sale.
"Bluffing" within CDEFG, · on the other hand, is entirely appropriate.

The

question is, how does the seller optimally proceed from F to CD in such a way
that he maximizes his expected profit (i.e., is as close to D as possible)?
Of course, if the marginal utility of money is constant and the same for
both the buyer and seller, and is known to be so by both parties, then the
logical route to CD would be a symmetric route, intersecting CD perpendicularly at J.

In the event that this intersection is between C and H or D and

I, both infeasible solutions, the ultimate solution would move to poi nts C or
D, respectively.

This is the case in which the seller and buyer "split the
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difference."

However, we know that marginal utilities of money are not con-

stant nor are they the same for all individuals.

Thus a "splitting the dif-

ference" situation would not necessarily be the outcome.

Furthermore, neither

the seller nor buyer knows what his opponent's marginal utilities are for
sure.

Each could thus successfully "bluff" his way to a more profitable

transaction.l3
One additional consideration in all this is that both the seller and
buyer have knowledge of the "market value" estimate of the property provided
through comparables or an appraiser's estimate.

This provides an independent

guide toward the ultimate transactions price which keeps the bluffing at a
restricted level.

Case (1979) presents an "export-import" game which is

analogous to this situation.
The negotiating game described above is a two person zero-sum or non-zero
sum game , depending on whether or not the utility of money is constant and
equal for buyer and seller.
final transaction.

There are a number of steps (counter-bids) to a

The game is a very rich and complex one because it in-

volves "learning" behavior by both the buyer and seller, received through
counter-bids, and it involves "bluffing" strategies.

Additional research ef-

forts should be applied toward better understanding of its nature.
Thus, we find that the broader optimal stopping/job search and bargaining
literature has been useful to us in one case, specifically the ability to model a learned distribution of bids.

However, in our search for good analogies

representing the relationship between the asking price and the level (or distribution) and frequency of bids, the importance of multiple independent terms
to the transaction, and the nature of the bargaining process, we are left with
relatively little guidance, but several suggestions for future research efforts.

In the next section, we incorporate Rothschild's learned distribution
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of bids in an improved search model of selling behavior and compare its behavior to more traditional models through simulations.
IV.

A Proposal For an Improved Model

In this section we shall propose a modest extension to existing models of

real estate seller behavior, building upon the contributions noted in the previous section.

To test its relative usefulness, comparisons will be made of

its performance with the performance of traditional transactions models with
respect to expected sales price and time-on-market.
The notable contribution of the proposed model is that it incorporates
Rothschild's (1974) suggestion of a "learned" notion of a bid distribution for
Extensions which

the relatively general case in which the prior is Dirichlet.

incorporate consideration of the relationships between the asking price and
the frequency and level (or distribution) of bids, multiple terms to the
transaction, and negotiation will be left as later exercises.
Model Development
Assume that the seller behaves as if the potential bids for his property
are distributed amonga finite number of bid levels Pd1• Pd2• ••• Pdn• ranging
from Pd 1 at the low end to Pdn at the high end.

The probability distribution

of prices is an initially unknown multinominal distribution.

This distribu-

tion is completely characterized by the vector II whose ith element IIi is the
actual (unknown) probability that the ith price is chosen.

Since II is a prob-

ability distribution,
( 1)

II e 6. { (x 1, ••• , Xn) e Rn

I

xi ;;. 0, Ext = 1}.

In the limit as n goes to infinity within a given price range, II can approach
any probability distribution over the range.
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The seller has a Dirichlet prior distribution F(

) over

~.

He updates

this prior recording to Baye's rule each time after he receives more information about the distribution of bids in the form of an offered bid.

The total

information he has at any point in time is contained in the number of times
each bid level has been received Ni, or, equivalently, in the total number of
bids received S(N) (or its inverse p
has been observed ~i

1
= S(N))

and the proportion of time each

= Ni/S(N) = NiP•

Each time a bid is received, this information set is updated according to
the following rule:
(~,p)

with the observation of price i, the information set

becomes

... , p ++1. , ... ,
~i

( 2)

~n

p

p

+ 1'

P
p

+ 1)

The objective of the seller is to make optimal use of this information as
he accumulates it to maximize his expected net gain from sale.

Each bid re-

jected costs the seller an amount c in the form of time and other opportunity
costs.

We shall assume for the time being c is constant.

Furthermore, we

shall assume initially that one bid is received per time period and the level
and frequency of bids is independent of the asking price.

Thus the asking

price becomes an irrelevant consideration; only the optimal reservation price
is of concern.

Finally, we shall assume a seller cannot recall a bid once it

is rejected but replaces a bid once it is received so that it again becomes
part of the unknown distribution of bids.14
Let

Ai(~,p)

be a probability distribution representing the searcher's ex-

pected beliefs of the likelihood that the next price observed would be Pdi•
Rothschild shows that lim

Ai(~,p)

= ~i

and that, if the prior is Dirichlet,

P+O

then it is possible to parameterize experience so that Ai
Let
offer is

v 0 (~,p) = LAi(~,p)pdi

= r~iPdi

(~,p)

= ~i·

be the expected sales price if an

accepted, given prior information

(~,p).

Let

VT(~,p)

be the maximum
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expected net sales price received by a seller with pr.ior experience (u ,~) who
is allowed to accept at most T + 1 bids, but must accept the T + 1th price
offer made to him.
(3)

This would be represented by

VT(u,p) • LAi(u,p)max {pdi' VT_ 1 [hi(u,p)] - c},
i

which is interpretable as follows:

if a

search~r

rejects a price offer Pdi'

he receives an updated expected sales price VT-1 [hi (u ,p)] less the cost of
rejection c.

The maximum possible price for each i is thus max{Pdi'

VT_ 1 [hi(u,p)] - c}.

This quantity is then multiplied by the (prior) probabil-

ity of observing Pdi' Ai(u,p), and added to yield the maximum expected net
sales price given information (u,p).

Rothschild shows by induction that

VT(IJ,p) > VT-1(u,p) and VT(IJ,p) < Pdn for all T, so the VT(IJ,p) converge.
lim
Furthermore if V(iJ,p) "'T+oo VT(u,p), then V(IJ,p), satisfies
(4)

V(IJ,p) •

L Ai(IJ,p)

max {Pdi' V[hi(IJ,p)]- c},

i

which defines the optimal policy for a potentially infinite time period to
sale:
If Pdi is drawn when beliefs are (IJ,p), accept if

otherwise elicit another bid.
The solution is illustrated numerically in the following example.
there are two possible prices, Pd1

Assume

= 1 and Pd2 = 2, and our prior beliefs,

based upon 10 observations, are that these are uniformly distributed (i.e.,
equal likelihood of occurrence; each appeared 5 times).
.5(1) + .5 (2) .. 1.5.

Thus Vo(.5, .5, .1)

~

If we were to sample once again and price Pd1 appeared,

then our updated information set becomes
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( 6)

h1(lJ,p) = (• 5 + • 1 ,
.s ,
• 1 1)
.1+1
.1+1 .1+

= (.545,

.455, .091)

and the updated expected gross sales price becomes
(7)

v0 [h 1(lJ,p)J = .545(1) + .455(2) = 1.4ss

If the cost of search

c

= 1.405.

=

..
.OS, then the updated expected net sales price is

Doing the same in the case in which price P2 appears results in

(8)

h2(lJ,p) = (.455, .545, .091)

(9)

v0 [h 2 (lJ,p)J = 1.545

(10)

v0 [h 2 (lJ,p)J

- c

=

1.495

(11) max{pd 2 , v0 [h 2 ,lJ,p)] - c} = pd 2 = 2

(12) V1(lJ,p) = A1(lJ,p) {Vo[h1(lJ,p)] - c} + A2(lJ,p)pd2

=

.5(1.405) +.5(2)

= 1.7025
Note that V1(lJ,p)

> Vo(lJ,p)

taken forT= 2, •••

but V1(lJ,p)

,~,yielding

< Pd2•

This exercise could be under-

ultimately the maximum expected net sales

price if one were allowed to receive an infinite number of additional bids
when his current beliefs are (lJ,p).

This must converge.

The seller under

these conditions compares this expected net return from rejecting, V[hi(lJ,p)]
- c, to the bid received, Pdi' and selects the maximum.
The process begins again upon the receipt of the next bid (if the first
one is rejected), whereupon the priors and reservation price are updated.

I
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Model PerfnrmR.nce Comparisons

In this section we empirically compare the performance of the "learning"
model developed above with two other search models which have been applied to
the real estate market -- the Stull (1978a) model based upon an unknown (and
unlearned) distribution of bids and the Simon (1957) model, based upon a known
(or assumed) distribution of bids.

Each is examined from the standpoint of

reservation prices over time, expected sales price, and expected time-onmarket.

The comparisons are carried out under four assumed bid distributions

from which bids are randomly selected:

a standard uniform distribution, a

standard right triangular distribution, a standard left triangular distribution, and a standard symmetric triangular distribution, each with Pmin
and Pmax

=

1.0.

standard uniform.

= 0.0

The Simon model assumes the actual bid distribution is always
The Stull model, of course, makes no assumptions about the

nature of the bid distribution.

The prior Dirichlet distribution for the

Rothschild model is assumed to approximate that of a standard uniform distribution.

Of course, the prior for the Rothschild model adjusts over time as

bids are received; that for the Simon model does not.
The three models were rendered as consistent as possible to make comparisons meaningful.

The distribution and frequency of bids was assumed indepen-

dent of asking price, hence rendering asking price an irrelevant consideration.

Money was taken as the unit of measurement, and no non-price terms were

considered.

The possibility of bargaining was not taken into account.

Dis-

counting was not considered directly, and the costs of search were assumed to
be zero, but the time horizon was assumed to be finite (10 periods).
a)

Model I:

The Stull Model.

The Stull model, a variation on the

beauty contest problem, develops a strategy which maximizes the probability of
selecting the largest price, rather than maximizing the expected price.

The
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optimal strategy is of the following form:

Pass S-1 bids and select the first

one thereafter which is greater than those passed.

This bid is called a can-

didate.
The probability of getting the highest price when there are N bids and
S-1 are to be passed is
(13) n(S,N) =

Stull shows n is maximized for N

= 10 when S*-1 = 3.

Thus, the reservation

price for the first three periods is Pmax' the maximum possible bid from the
unknown distribution (which is 1. 0 for our simulations).
time the seller samples the market.

It is during this

After period 3 he adjusts his reservation

price to the maximum of the three bids observed previously.
woul4

v~ry

This, of course,

depending on the nature of the bid distribution and the bids actu-

ally observed.

The expected value of the sample maximum for a sample of size

i from a distribution, E(Pmax ), must satisfy the criterion.
i

(14) Prob (p ~ E[Pmaxi])

i

=1+i •

For a standard uniform distribution this is simply
i

1 + iand E(pmax

1 = 0.750,

for a standard right triangular distribution,
(16) E(Pmaxi)

=

~

and E(Pmax 3 )

= .866,

for a standard left triangular distribution,

o. 500,
and finally for a standard symmetric triangular distribution,
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E(Pmax 3 > becomes the expected reservation price for periods 4 through 9.

(In

period 10, of course, the reservation price must be zero since any observed
price must be accepted.)

Thus, although the seller has no knowledge, nor does

he ever develop any knowledge, of the bid distribution, he nonetheless adjusts
his strategy according to information received in the first three bids•
could therefore be considered a crude "learning" strategy.

This

The expected res-

ervation price trend for the Stull model is plotted in Figure 6 and listed in
Table 2.
The expected sales price in the Stull model for a general distribution
and N periods to required sale is
N-1

(19) E(pN) ..

L

i•S*

S*-1
i(i+1)

Tne first term in the sum is the probability of stopping at (and therefore accepting) the ith serious offer.

The second is simply the expected price i f

accepted, which is the expected value of the sample maxi!Dlm for a sample of
size i from the general distribution.

The last term is the same as those pre-

vious, except that the relevant expected price is the mean of the bid distribution, since the last offer must be accepted.
uniform distribution, E(p 10 )
tribution, E(p 10 )

= 0.846,

= 0.725.

For N = 10 and a standard

For the standard right triangular dis-

and for the standard left triangular distribution,

E(p 10 ) • 0.497.

Finally, for the standard symmetric triangular distribution,

E(p 10 ) • 0.645.

Note that, as expected, the expected sales price varies de-

pending on the bid distribution, since the setting of the reservation price in
periods 4-9 depends upon the sampling from the distribution in periods 1-3.
Furthermore, as expected, the expected sales price is higher for a rightwardskewed distribution and vice-versa.
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Model Comparisons
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Finally, Stull shows the expected time-on-market in his model is
(20) E(WN)

=
i

For N

=

10, E(W 1o)

N- 1

L
=

s

S* 1
S* 1
*i(1/i)[~] + N [~]

= 6.990.

=N

(S*,N)+S*-1 .15

Note that this waiting time is independent of the

actual distribution of bids since it was derived without any assumption about
the bid distribution.

The performance of the Stull model with respect to ex-

pected sales price and expected time-on-market is summarized in Table 3.
b)

Model II:

The Simon Model.

knowledge of the bid distribution.

The Simon model is based upon full
It incorporates an expected price maximi-

zation strategy, which is more common among optimal stopping models than the
Stull strategy of maximizing the probability of selecting the largest price.
Since the bid distribution is known (or, more correctly, assumed), the optimal
strategy (i.e., reservation price over time) is invariant with the actual distribution encountered.

However, model performance, of course, depends upon

how well the assumed distribution approximates that actually encountered.

The

optimal strategy for setting the reservation price in the Simon model is as
follows:

Accept a bid only if it is greater than the expected return from re-

jecting it, but always accept the last bid.

This implies that there is a di-

rect relationship between the reservation price and the expected sales price.
Let us derive the reservation price and expected sales price for a general distribution using induction.
sale.

Assume there are N

=2

periods to required

The optimal strategy has the following form:
If the first offer Pa is such that
Pa

> E(pr),

accept it.

Otherwise accept Pr•

E(Pr), the expected return from rejecting the bid, is simply the expected
price of a single sample from the bid distribution, or simply the mean of the
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Table 3
Model Comparisons
Expected Sales Price and Expected Time-on-Market
10 Periods to Required Sale
Actual Bid Distribution
Model

Standard
Uniform

Standard Right
Triangular

Standard Left
Triangular

Standard
Symmetric
Triangular

Expected Sales Price
I.

II.

III.

Unknown Distribution (Stull)

0.725

0.846

0.497

o. 645

Assumed Standard
Uniform Distribution (Simon)

0.861

0.909

0.548

0.694

"Learned" Distribution (Rothschild)

0.840

0.913

o. 577

0.709

Expected Time-on-Market
I.

II.

III.

Unknown Distribution (Stull)

6.990

6.990

6.990

6.990

Assumed Standard
Uniform Distribution (Simon)

4.602

3.038

8.133

6.810

"Learned" Distribution (Rothschild)

4.865

3.805

7.917

7. 472
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hirl distribution, {E(pr) I Prob[p(E(pr)] = 0. 5}.

The expected sales price i f

the seller follows this strategy is the probability of accepting the first bid
times the expected value if it is accepted plus the probability of accepting
the second times its expected value, or
(21) E(p 2 )

=~

{E(pa)[Prob[p(E(pa)l

= 0.75}

+ ~ {E(pr)[Prob [p(E(pr)l
In the case of N

= 3,

= 0.5}

the seller again will accept the first offer re-

ceived only if it is greater than the expected return from rejecting it.
latter expectation is simply E(p 2 ).

Thus, the optimal strategy becomes:

If the first offer ) E(p2), accept it.
the second.

This

Otherwise go on to

If the second offer is ) {E(pr)IProb[p(E(pr)]

.. 0. 5}, accept it.

Otherwise accept the third.

The reservation price with three periods to required sale then becomes the expected sales price with two periods to required sale.

Again, the expected

sales price is easily calculated:

This expression can now be written in general form for any arbitrary N:
(23) E(PN+l) = [1-E(pN)][E(pa)[Prob[p(E(pa)] = ~ [E(pN)+l]]
+ E(pN)2.
In our simulations, we assume the seller is assuming a standard unifo.rm

bid distribution, regardless of experience with bids received.
as shown in Stull,

In this case,
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(24) {E(pa)IProb[p(E(pa)l

2

=

1 [E(pN)+1]}
1

2 [E(pN)+1]'

and expression (23) simplifies to

The reservation price with N + 1 periods to required sale is simply the expected sales price with N periods to required sale.

The reservation price

trend for the Simon model is graphed in Figure 6 and charted in Table 2.
it is invariant with the actual bid distribution encountered.

NOte

Furthermore,

note that it declines at an increasing rate over time and is lower than the
Stull model reservation price for the early bids.
The above expected sales price expression is a valid representation of
the expected sales price if both the assumed and actual bid distributions are
standard uniform.

However, if the assumed bid distribution is standard uni-

form and the actual bid distribution is not, then the expected sales price deviates from expression (25).

In such a case, the reservation prices if a cer-

tain bid is received remain invariant, but the probability of receiving a certain bid varies depending on the actual distribution encountered.

Let us

= E(pN) to be the reservation price with N + 1 periods to reN+1
quired sale as determined in expression (25) above, assuming a standard uni-

designate PR

form distribution.

For N

= 2,

... Prob(p)pR 2 ){E(pa) I Prob[p(E(pa)] -- 21 [Prob(p(pR 2 )+1]}
+ Prob(p(pR2 )E(p 1 )'
where
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For N • 3,
(28) E (p 3 )• • Prob(p>pR 3 ){E(pa)IProb[p~E(pa)]
+

=~

[Prob (p~pR 3 )+1]}

Prob(p~pR 3 )E(p 2 )'.

For arbitrary N, this becomes
(29) E(pN+ 1 )• = Prob(p>pR_

){E(pa)1Prob[p~E(pa)1 =

-~+1

+

Prob(p~pR_

)E(pN)'

-~+1

1

2 [Prob

(p~p R

.

)+1]}
N+1

•

Now, if in fact the actual distribution encountered is standard uniform, then
(30) Prob(p)pR

) = 1 - E(pN)
N+1

and

Thus

and expression (29) collapses to expression (25).
For N=10 and an assumed standard uniform distribution, if a standard uniform distribution actually occurs, E(p 10 )

= 0.861.

However, i f a standard

· right triangular distribution is encountered, E(P10) = 0.909, and if a standard left triangular distribution is encountered, E (p 10) = 0. 548.

Finally,

if a standard symmetic triangular distribution is encountered, E(p 10) = O. 694. ··
These results are summarized in Table 3.

Note that the Simon model expected-

sales-price results dominate those for the Stull model in every case, suggesting that even if a wrong guess is made about the distribution of bids, a seller may be better off assuming a standard uniform distribution and using an

ex~

pected price maximization strategy than using the beauty contest strategy suggested by Stull.

49

Finally, let us turn to the expected waiting time, which is simply

For N • 10, and if the actual distribution encountered is standard uniform, E(w 10 ) • 4.602.

E(w 10 )

a

3.038.

If the distribution is standard right triangular,

This is lower, as expected, since the seller would be more

likely to receive an acceptable bid earlier under a rightward-skewed distribution.

If the distribution is standard left triangular, however, E(W10) in-

creases to 8.133.

And finally, if the distribution is standard symmetric tri-

angular, E(w 10 ) increases to 6.810.

This is expected since there are fewer

"high end" bids under the standard symmetric triangular distribution than under the standard uniform distribution, rendering a longer search necessary.
~ote

in Table 3 that, for three of the four distributions, the expected

time-on-market is shorter under the Simon Model than under the StQll model, in
spite of the fact that the expected sales price is greater.

This seems coun-

terintuitive at first, but can be explained by considering the inefficiencies
generated in the Stull model by automatically waiting three periods to consider a bid and then only adjusting the reservation price a single time.

Only in

the standard left triangular distribution case must the seller trade off a
higher sales price for a longer waiting time.
c)

Model III:

The Rothschild Model.

The Rothschild model hypothesizes

behavior different from that for either the Stull or Simon models.

It assumes

an initial distribution based upon previous experience or comparison with
comparables as does the Simon model, but updates this in a Bayesian fashion
over time as bids are received.

Thus it reflects learning behavior, as does

the Stull model, but with more sophisticated use of the information.

The
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objective is to maximize the expected sales price, like that of the Simon
model.
For comparison purposes, we assumed the seller held an initial Dirichlet
prior with equal probabilities of occurrence of each of 5 prices spaced uniformly along the interval (0,1).

This approximates the standard uniform dis-

tribution assumed for the Simon model.

It is assumed this prior is derived

from either past market experience or observation of bids on comparable properties.

One observation of each of the 5 prices Pdi

1.00) is assumed to have been made initially.

As

~

(0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75,

bids Pt are received from

the actual bid distribution with t periods to required sale, they are mapped
into the updated Dirichlet prior according to the following mapping:
( 34)

o.o

(;

Pt

0.2

(;

Pt

0.4

(;

Pt

0.6

(

Pt

0.8

(

Pt

= o.oo

< 0.2 ·>
< 0.4 =>

Pt

+

Pd1

Pt

+

Pd2 - 0.25

< 0.6 =>
< 0.8 ==>

Pt

+

Pd3

= 0.50

Pt

+

Pd4

= 0.75

=>

Pt

+ Pd~

(;

1. 0

= 1. 00. 16

The optimal strategy is of the followingform in the case in which search
costs are zero, there are N periods for search, and the seller must accept the
Nth price offer:
If PN is drawn when beliefs are (~,p), accept if

where

and

hi(~,p)

is the updated information set, given that price PN

has been observed.

Otherwise elicit another bid.
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VN-l

(~,p)

is simply the maximum expected price obtained by a searcher with

prior experience

(~,p)

who is allowed to search at most N times but must ac-

cept the Nth price offer made to him.

Working back to N=l,

is simply the expected value of the sales price upon the receipt of a single
bid, given beliefs

(~,p).

Expression (35) defines the reservation price with N periods to required
sale.

After the first bid is received, i f he rejects the bid, the seller ad-

justs his prior and faces a new problem with initial beliefs
searches permitted.
last bid.

hi(~,p)

and N-1

This process continues until the seller must accept the

It should be noted that, as in the Stull model, the reservation

price trend is not

determined~

priori.

It varies, depending on actual bid

experience, but the expected reservation price trend over time can be calculated, given the set of initial beliefs and the actual bid distribution.
expected reservation price in period N, given beliefs

(~,p)

The

prior to bid

receipt, E(PR. /(}l,p)), is simply
N

(38) E(PR.N/(~,p)) =

J Prob(pN-l

pdj)VN_,l[hj(~,p)],

+

or the average of the possible reservation prices weighted by the probability
J

of receiving each bid.
~j

The probability of bid Pdj being received is simply

~j(~,p)

a

tered.

For our standard uniform case

in the event that the prior is the actual distribution encoun~

• (0.20, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20).

However, in the event the actual bid distribution does not conform to the prior, Prob(pN.;..l

+

Pdj)

*

~j·

In particular, given our mapping scheme from the

actual bid distribution to the Dirichlet, for the standard right triangular
distribution,
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(39) Prob(PN-1

+

Pdj) • (0.04, 0.12, 0.20,

0.2~,

0.36);

for the standard left triangular distribution,
(40) Prob(PN-1

+

Pdj)

= (0.36,

0.28, 0.20, 0.12, 0.04);

and finally, for the standard symmetric triangular distribution,
(41) Prob(PN-1

+

Pdj) = (0.08, 0.24, 0.36, 0.24, 0.08).

The expected reservation price trend for each of the four assumed actual distributions is plotted in Figure 6 and listed in Table 2.
beginning of period 1 the seller holds initial beliefs
0.20, 0.20, 0.20, 0.20).

It is assumed at the

(~,p)

=

(0.20, 0.20,

Of course, any set of initial beliefs is possible.

The set chosen was felt to approximate adequately the standard uniform distribution assumption of the Simon model.

Essentially the calculation of the ex-

pected reservation price for each period then involves first the estimation of
the set of all possible reservation prices for that period, then weighting
those by the probability of occurrence of each.17
Note in Figure 6 that if the standard uniform distribution is actually
encountered, the expected reservation price trend approximates very closely
the reservation price trend in the Simon model.

It is slightly higher, on the

average, hence one would expect there to be a slightly greater probability of
not receiving an acceptable bid in the first nine periods and being forced to
accept the tenth bid.

Thus the expected sales price would be expected to be

somewhat lower than that for the Simon model and the expected time-on-market
to be somewhat longer, but because of the close approximation to the Simon
reservation price trend, model performance would be expected to be comparable
(we shall see later this is, indeed, the case).

53
In the event the actual bid distribution encountered is not standard uniform, however, the expected reservation price trend for the Rothschild model
is seen to shift upward or downward, depending on whether the distribution is
skewed upward or downward respectively.

In the case of the standard symmetric

triangular distribution, the reservation price trend is shifted somewhat lower
because fewer "high end" bids are expectd than in the standard uniform case.
Because of its sensitivity to differences in sampling experience, we would
probably expect the Rothschild model to perform somewhat better than the Simon
""";

model in terms of expected sales price whenever the actual bid distribution
deviates significantly from the assumed bid distribution.

However, the ex-

pected time-on-market comparisons would be expected to vary depending on the
nature of the actual distribution encountered. 18

Again, we shall see later

this is, indeed, the case.
One interesting observation is that, in the case of the standard right
triangular distribution, the expected reservation price trend actually increases initially.

This intuitively seems appropriate, as one is quickly re-

vising upward his expectations of what he will be offered.
is observed occasionally in practice.
finding that

VN(~,p)) VN-l(~,p)

Such a phenomenon

It does not contradict Rothschild's

since the information set is continuously up-

dated and we are actually comparing E(PR /(~,p)) to E(PR.. /h(~,p)).
N
~~-1
Let us turn now to consideration of expected sales price in the Rothschild model for each of the possible bid distributions.

The expected sales

price is simply the sum of the probability of accepting a given price times
its expected value plus the probability of rejecting a given price times the
expected price if the bid is rejected.

This occurs for each of the possible

outcomes of a bid, so in order to derive the expected sales price, each of
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these possible outcomes must be weighted by its probability of occurrence each
period and summed.
The probability of acceptance of a bid depends upon the nature of our
mapping into the Dirichlet distribution and the relationship of the mapped bid
to

th~

reservation price PRt•

A price received Pt exists within a certain

range of bids in the actual bid distribution (Pmin , Pmax ) [see expression
i

i

(34)], which is mapped in turn into a certain price Pdi in the Dirichlet.

If

the reservation price is below this range, then the probability of acceptance
Prob(pt PRt)

is unity.

acceptance is zero.

If it is above this range, then the probability of

If, however, the reservation price is within this range,

then Prob(pt PRt) is between zero and one.

This depends upon the range in
These

question and the nature of the actual bid distribution encountered.
probabilities are tabulated in Table 4.

Of course the probability of rejectFor the

ing a given price is simply one less its probability of acceptance.

last period (period 10 in our case) the probability of acceptance must be
unity.
The expected value of the bid, given that it has been accepted, again depends upon the nature of the mapping into the Dirichlet and the actual bid
distribution.

If the reservation price PRt is below the range (Pmin , Pmax ),
i

i

If PRt

then the expected value is simply the expected price within the range.

is above the range, then the expected value does not exist, since the probability of acceptance is zero.

If, however, PRt is within the range, then the

expected value is simply the expected value within the range (PRt• Pmax.>•
1

These relationships are shown in Table 5.

For the next-to-the-last period

(period 9 in our case), the expected value in the event of bid rejection must
be the mean of the actual bid distribution (since the seller must accept the
last bid).

This is 0.5 for the standard uniform distribution,

Pmax

o.o

PR - Pmin
Pmax - Pmin

1. 0

Standard
Uniform

2 - Pmin 2

o.o

Pmax

PR2 - Pmin 2

1. 0

o.o

(Pmax-PR)(2-PR-Pmax)
CPmax-pmin)(Z-pmax-pmin1

1. 0

1. 0

Standard
Symmetric
Triangular

Pmin

.36

2( 1 -pR)2

.36

2

o.o

- .32

0. 68 - 2pR2

Pmax

2 -

Pmax 2 - PR 2

0.4

> 0.6

and pR

= 0.4
> 0.5

for Pmin

for Pmin = 0.4
and PR
o. 5

for Pmax

2
2
(1-PR) - (1-Pmax)
for pmi
n
(1-Pmin) 2 - (1-pmax) 2

Actual Bid Distribution
Standard
left
Triangular

The subscripts i and t have been dropped for simplicity of exposition.
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Note:
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> 0. 6

> 0. 6

PR ) 0.5

for PJOin • 0. 4 and

PR < 0. 5

for Patn • 0.4 and

for Paax < 0.4

for Pmin

for Paoin - 0.4

for Paax < 0.4

for PJOin

..."'
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{f• .707 for the standard right triangular distribution, 1 -If.= .293 for the
standard left triangular distribution, and 0.5 for the standard symmetric triangular distribution.

For earlier periods, the expected value in the event of

bid rejection is simply the average of the possible expected values from the
subsequent period weighted by the probability of receipt of each bid.
The results of the expected sales price calculations for the Rothschild
model are shown in Table 3.

As

expected, the Rothschild model performs

slightly inferior to the Simon model if the assumed standard uniform bid distribution is the actual distribution (0.840 vs. 0.861).

However, when our

guess about the actual bid distribution is wrong, in every case the Rothschild
model performed superior to the Simon model.

This was especially true in the

case of the standard left triangular distribution in which the penalty in the
Simon model for holding too optimistic expectations about the bid distribution
is most severe (i.e., the seller has a much greater probability of being
forced to accept the last bid, which is drawn from a downward skewed
distribution).19
These results imply that the "optimal" strategy to be followed by the
seller should depend both on any a priori information about the likely distribution of bids and the seller's degree of risk aversion.

In the event that

each of the bid distributions has an equal probability of occurrence, a risk
neutral seller would prefer the Rothschild strategy (expected sales price
0.760 vs. 0.753 for the Simon model).

=

Positive risk aversion would also sug-

gest the Rothschild model (so long as the seller does not have substantial
confidence that the assumed bid distribution is the actual distribution).
Only in the case in which the seller is a risk searcher or for some reason has
substantial confidence that the assumed standard uniform distribution is the
actual distribution would he select the Simon strategy.20

The seller would
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avoid the Simon strategy especially when there is a significant possibility of
encountering a downward skewed distribution.
Finally, let us examine the expected time-on-market performance of the
Rothschild model.

The relationship for expected time-on-market is closely

akin to that for expected sales price:

It is the sum of the probability of

accepting a given price times the period in which it appears plus the probability of rejecting a given price times the expected time-on-market if the
bid is rejected.

Again, this occurs for each of the possible outcomes of a

bid, so in order to derive the expected time-on-market, each of these possible
outcomes must be weighted by their probability of occurrence and summed.

The

probability of acceptance and rejection is calculated according to the procedure described in calculating expected sales price.

The expected time-

on-market if the bid is rejected is simply the expected time-on-market with
t-1 periods to forced sale.
The results of the expected time-on-market calculations for the Rothschild model are shown in Table 3.

If the actual bid distribution is standard

uniform, the Rothschild strategy is somewhat less efficient than the Simon
strategy in that, not only is the expected sales price somewhat lower, the expected time-on-market is somewhat longer (4.865 periods vs. 4.602 in the Simon
model).

This is expected, since the slightly higher expected reservation

price trend in the Rothschild strategy results in a longer expected time period until an acceptable bid is received.
For the other bid distributions, however, the expected time-on-market using the Rothschild strategy is sometimes longer, but sometimes shorter than
using the Simon strategy.

This does not necessarily relate to the degree of

efficiency in search behavior, since the expected sales price is higher under
the Rothschild strategy in all cases, but rather has to do with the ability of
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each strategy to respond to the bid distribution actually encountered.

In the

case of the standard right triangular distribution, the Rothschild model has a
higher expected time-on-market because it quite properly encourages the seller
to wait in the expectation of a higher bid in the future.

The reverse is true

in the case of the standard left triangular distribution.

In the case of the

standard symmetric triangular distribution, the explanation for the longer expected time-on-market under the Rothschild strategy is somewhat unexpected,
since the lowered reservation price trend under this strategy would suggest
somewhat earlier acceptance of a price.

However, a possible explanation might

lie in the fact that a seller under a standard symmetric triangular distribution has an incentive to continued search beyond the expected sales price of
0.694 under the Simon strategy because his probability of obtaining a bid in
excess of this amount is greater (at least up to Pt
standard uniform distribution.

= 0.750) than under a

This incentive to continued search would be

manifest as a longer expected time-on-market.
V.

Summary and Conclusions

Our examination of seller behavior in residential sales has revealed that
the selling strategy is oftentimes relatively crude, constrained in part by
· lack of information availability, in part by lack of analytic expertise, in
part by the rapid dynamics of the market.

However, there clearly exist a num-

ber of characteristics of this process which serve both as the basis for an
improved descriptive modeling effort and as clues toward the development of a
normative model which could potentially improve sales performance.

First, the

process represents a sequential bid process, normally without recall.
it exists in an environment in which there is

limited ~

Second,

priori information

about the distribution of potential bids and the relationships between asking
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price and bid frequencies and levels.

Subsequent information is obtained only

through experience as bids are received.

Third, the sale consists not only of

a "price" but also a set of "non-price" transactions in the form of the nonprice terms of the contract.

Finally, bargaining and negotiation often play a

major role in the determination of the nature of the outcome.
Existing search models, both those narrowly constructed within the real
estate/urban land economics tradition and those more broadly constructed in
the literature on the economics of job search and uncertainty, provide varying
degree.s of adherence to the characteristics of the actual real estate transactions process.

However, no efforts have explicitly considered a learned rela-

tionship between asking price and the frequency and level (or distribution) of
bids.

This creates the unrealistic situation in which the asking price is ir-

relevant; only the reservation price is of any concern.

Few attempts likewise

have been made to estimate empirically the marginal utilities of various nonprice terms (such as mortgage terms) in residential transactions.

Nor has

bargaining behavior in a real estate market context been investigated.

These

are all fertile grounds for future research efforts.
However, in one area, past research has provided us with a potentially
significant improvement in our ability to model the transactions process.

Ex-

isting real estate search models assume the distribution of potential bids is
either fully known or fully unknown, whereas in reality one makes use of
vious bids received to improve his reservation price strategy.

pre~

Such behavior

is encompassed in a "learning" model postulated by Rothschild (1974) in which
the prior is a Dirichlet distribution which is updated in a Bayesian fashion
as bids are received.

One of the primary contributions of this paper has been

an evaluation of the performance of t .his model with respect to expected sales
price and expected time-on-market and a comparison of its performance with
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that of two of the more traditional search models of real estate market behavior:

a model which assumes a completely known distribution (the Simon [1957]

model) and one which assumes a completely unknown distribution (the Stull
[1978a] model).

The following salient results were obtained from this exer-

cise:
1.

The Simon model performs optimally, as expected, when the actual bid
distribution is identical to that assumed (in our case a stand uniform distribution).

2.

The Rothschild model performance approaches that of the Simon model
when the bid distribution is correctly assumed.

3.

When the bid distribution is correctly assumed, the Stull model,
because of the inefficiencies generated by automatically waiting
several periods before considering a bid and then only adjusting the
reservation price a single time, performs considerably less well
than either of the other models, both with respect to a lower expected sales price and a longer expected time-on-market.

4.

When the actual bid distribution is different from that initially
assumed (in our case, when it is either right, left, or symmetic
triangular rather than standard uniform), the Rothschild model performs the best of the three models with respect to expected sales
price.

This is because of its efficient use of information to im-

prove reservation price strategy.

Performance is especially im-

proved when the actual bid distribution is downward skewed, as is
the left triangular distribution.
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5.

When the actual bid distribution is different from that initially
assumed, the Stull model performs substantially less well than the
other two models with respect to expected sales price.

Thus, the

Stull model is dominated whether or not the actual bid distribution
is correctly assumed, and its use would not be optimal even under
conditions of considerable lack of information about the true distribution of bids.
6.

The expected reservation price trend is actually positive for a time
in the Rothschild model under conditions in which there is a sufficiently strong upward adjustment in the Dirichlet representation of
the bid distribution as bids are received.
sometimes observed in practice.

This is expected and

It does not conflict with negative

reservation price trend requirements, which are based upon static
assumptions about the bid distribution, because the information set
is updated each period.

Indeed, observation of a positively sloped

reservation price trend in the marketplace would constitute evidence
of behavior more consistent with the Rothschild model than with the
other two models.
In summary, the results suggest the inferiority of the Stull model and
the superiority of the Rothschild model as appropriate models of selling behavior in the real estate market.

Stull suggests his model may be more appro-

priate under conditions of considerable uncertainty in the actual distribution
of bids.

We have shown that even under such conditions, the Stull model would

be expected to perform inferior to both the Simon and Rothschild models.

More

importantly, the Rothschild model in such cases can provide considerable improvement over the Simon model, which rigidly assumes a single known bid
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priori (which may, of course, be wrong).

Only in the case in

which there is considerable confidence that the assumed bid distribution is
the actual bid distribution would the Simon model 'be preferred.
To the extent that individuals engaged in selling behavior in the long
run set their reservation price trends in a more or less optimal fashion (regardless of whether or not they actually undertake the calculations developed
here), these results suggest they would tend to behave in most circumstances
more in accordance with the reservation price strategy predicted by the Rothschild model than either of the other two models.

Thus, the exercise here

could be viewed as a contribution to our descriptive understanding of seller
behavior in the real estate market as well as an improved normative model.
Further research efforts should attempt to empirically test reservation
price behavior, in the market (if possible) or in a controlled setting (if
necessary), to establish its adherence to one of the three models presented
here.

.Additional efforts should incorporate consideration of the role of both

the asking price, non-price terms, and bargaining in determining the ultimate
outcome of the transactions process.

We will begin to fully understand real

estate market behavior only after we improve our understanding of the true nature of the transactions process in the real estate market.
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Footnotes
1since we are concentrating on the seller, we do not consider the benefits and costs of brokers used in purchase. The commission is paid indirectly
by purchasers (at least in . part) through an increased purchase price (see Jud
[1982]). Another potential cost to purchasers is loss of control of search
through "steering." Benefits include reduced search time and effort, facilitation of document preparation and execution, advice on and possibly sources
·of financing, facilitation of negotiations, and perhaps providing advice on
offering bids and negotiations. ·
2This assumes adjustment of comparable sales prices has been complete.
To the extent that quality differences remain, however, there would be an upward or downward adjustment from the mean. There also might be weighted averages used in the event that one comparable is felt to be a much stronger incicator than another.
3This is an important point in that the existence of such a disparity of
goals between the seller and broker could result in numerous variations in
market behavior, depending upon market characteristics. For example, brokers
dealing with large volumes of lower-priced properties could develop different
strategies of sale than brokers dealing with very few higher-priced properties. Exploration of such possi~ilities would be interesting, but is beyond
the scope of this paper.
4simon [1957], p. 241.
5simon [1957], pp. 259-260.
6simon's model, which assumes perfect knowledge of the bid distribution,
has been extensively examined elsewhere in a real estate market context.
(See, for example, de Groot [1970], Stull [1978a]). Some of these have been
variations on the basic theme. All shall be described in this study as the
Simon model.
7of course, a number of additiqnal dimensions to the transactions process
could be considered which have not been discussed here. These include such
considerations as risk aversion, existence of a dynamic economy, bankruptcy
(in which the wealth position of the seller influences his search behavior),
optimal search-start strategies, and variable intensity of search. These are
considered to be more sophisticated "fine tunings" of the basic model which
are beyond the scope of this paper. Inclusion of such considerations would be
fruitful, however. The reader is referenced to Lippman and McCall (1976) for
a discussion of such extensions.
8The Dirichlet or multivariate beta distribution (see de Groot [1970],
pp. 49-51) is defined as follows: A random ve_£tor -X = (XI, •• f'Xk) ' has a
Dirichlet distribution with parametric v~ctor ~ = (a1•••••ak) (ai>O;i=l, ••• ,k)
if the probabilit~ density functton f(.la) of X satisfies the following
properties: let X = (Xl, ... ,Xk) be any point in Rk such that Xi)O f or
k

i•l, ••• ,k and

L

i=l

X:L

= 1.

Then
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and where it is known r(ai) has the following property:
r(ai) • (ai-1)f(ai-1) ai>1, or for any positive integer n, r(n)=(n-1)1.
Also, f (XI~) = 0 at any other point X e: Rk.
This distribution can perhaps be illustrated most intuitively using the following example provided by Rothschild (1974): Assume the searcher faces an
urn in which there are S(N) = ENi pieces of paper; Pd1 is written on N1 of
these slips, Pd2 on N2 of them, etc. We may consider these Pdi to be price
quotations, which, although discrete, could go in the limit to infinity over a
range. The searcher does not know the real . price distribution IT which generates the price quotations. However, as he samples from the urn (returning
the slip to the urn after each sample) he develops a "feel" for the probability of getting price Pdi from the urn. This is represented by the proportion
of times he has observed Pdi out of the total number of samples taken. If
price quotations are really generated by IT, then the strong law of large numbers states that this proportion will, with probability 1, eventually be equal
to rr.
9see Vandell ( 1981) for a preliminary effort at developing some notion of
the demand and supply influences of the non-rate terms of mortgage credit.
10The setting of the initial asking price by the seller is treated in (b)
above. Presumably the buyer also behaves according to an optimal utility maximiZing calculus in setting his response bid (and of course his reservation
price), but from the point of view of the seller this calculus is unknown (at
least at first).
llof course, inclusion of the non-price dimensions renders the bargaining
stage much more complex.
12Note that this is related to the setting of the initial asking price,
but is one bidding cycle removed from that situation. The problem of setting
the initial asking price is considered in (b) above.
13However, in the long run, assuming equal market power and skill in negotiation, one would expect a solution at that point along CD where both the
seller and buyer sacrifice equally (in utility terms) at the margin.
14This is equivalent to assuming either that there is a large number of
potential bidders (the competitive market case) or that a bidder, once rejected, cannot be recalled but could again enter the market with the same bid.
An interesting variation of this situation would be the case in which the bid
is not replaced and the seller must deal with a dwindling supply of bidders.
This would make the rejection of higher bids more costly, thus lowering the
reservation price.
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15This is only when the prybability of getting a serious offer each period is unity. Otherwise E(W) =- E(W), where q is the probability of getting a
q
serious offer each period.
160f course any mapping is possible. The intent here is to approximate
insofar as possible in the Dirichlet distribution the characteristics of the
assumed bid distribution of the Simon model. As the number of potential
prices in the Dirichlet distribution increases, in the limit it replicates exactly the assumed bid distribution. As the number of potential prices is increased, however, solution of the Rothschild model also become~ a bulkier
task. The selection of only five possible prices in the Dirichlet was made
necessary by computing time limitations. Simulation of the Rothschild model
over 10 periods required 15 minutes computing time.
17This would mean for period 1 there would be 5 possible outcomes, hence
5 possible reservation prices; for period 2, 25 possible reservation prices (5
possible outcomes for each of the 5 previous reservation prices); etc.
18That is, having a longer time-on-market would not necessarily imply
greater inefficiency in search, because the nature of the actual bid distribution may render a longer search time closer to optimality.
19m the case of the rightward-skewed distribution, on the other hand,
the seller's standards are too pessimistic and he accepts a bid too quickly in
the belief he may not see a bid so high again. His penalty is less severe,
however, since the bid is drawn from an upward skewed distribution.
20The probability of encountering a standard uniform distribution must
approach 43 percent if the other three distributions all have an equal probability of occurrence.
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